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Abstract
A bid rent model of propertv value determination in the presence
of a
public good and property taxation is developed. Using the local
Eovernment
budget constraint, an estimating equation is derived which can
indicate
whether public goods are efficiently provided. The empirical results
show overprovision of public goods in northeastern New Jersey.

PROPERTY VALUES, LOCAL PUBLIC EXPENDITURE,
AND ECONOMIC EFFICIENCY
by
Jan K. Brueckner*
Since the appearance of Oates' well-known 1969 paper, this journal has
published a number of studies concerned with the Tiebout hypothesis and the
effect of local public expenditures and property tax rates on property
values (see Pollakowski (1973), Oates (1973), Edel and Sclar (1974), King
(1977), and Rosen and Fullerton (1977)). The Tiebout hypothesis (Tiebout
(1956)) states that consumers have an incentive to segregate into communities
homogeneous by taste and income, where public goods are provided efficiently.
Tiebout conjectured that the problem of inefficient provision of a pure
public good in an economy with heterogeneous consumers, raised in Samuelson
(1954), would be mitigated by this voluntary division of the population
into efficient homogeneous groups. In his original paper, Oates claimed
that his empirical results, which show a positive influence of local
public expenditure on property values, constitute a favorable test of the
Tiebout hypothesis, and many of the above investigators view their results
similarly. The present paper is based on the belief that none of the
previous work in this area constitutes a test of the Tiebout hypothesis,
and that a proper test would bear no resemblance to previous studies.
In particular, results which show a positive influence of public spending
on property valves only establish that consumers value the public goods
they consume. Such results say nothing whatever about the efficiency of
public good provision, which is the ultimate implication of the Tiebout
hypothesis. Measuring changes in the degree of community homogeneity
*I am grateful to Wallace Oates for providing me with his data.
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over time would be the proper test of the hypothesis; increasing homogen-
eity would be evidence of the economy's movement toward an efficient
Tiebout equilibrium. No data need be gathered to perform this test;
casual observation shows that most communities are heterogeneous and that
there exists no long run tendency for consumers to separate into homo-
geneous groups. These observations are consistent with recent theoretical
results which have highlighted many difficulties in the Tiebout model (see,
for example, Stiglitz (1974), Wheaton (1975), McQuire (1974), Westhoff (1977)),
This paper will attempt to eliminate the confusion of previous studies
by abandoning the Tiebout hypothesis and focusing on the efficiency question
in a world which is not in Tiebout equilibrium. A theoretical model of
the determination of property values is developed which yields an estimating
equation that can indicate whether or not public goods are provided effi-
ciently, even in heterogeneous communities. Regression results based on
Gates' original sample are used to evaluate the efficiency of public good
provision in northeastern New Jersey.
Edel and Sclar have presented an informal analysis with results
somewhat similar to ours, but their approach is marred by imprecision
as well as the authors' confused notion that they were testing the Tiebout
hypothesis. The following analysis will clearly and rigorously demon-
strate for the first time what can be inferred from empirical results
relating property values to local fiscal variables.
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In this section, we develop a model of house value in the presence of
a public good and property taxation based on the bid-rent model of a housing
marketo For a recent exposition of this model, see Wheaton (1977),
The consumer utility function depends on x, q, and z, the consumption
levels of a numeraire non-housing private good, housing services, and a
public good, respectively, and each consumer has the same utility function.
The consumption level of the public good will be the same for all households
in the community which provides the goodo However, the good need not be
purely public; increasing the community population while holding the public
good output fixed may result in a lower per capita consumption level through
congestion. We also assum.e that there are no externalities between
communities associated with the public good. A crucial assumption is that
all consumers with the same income level reach the same level of utility
regardless of where they live. Since our sample for the empirical
work is a group of bedroom communities whose residents commute, for the
most part, to New York City, this assumption seems naturalo If utility
levels differed across communities, residences would change until the
disparity was eliminatedo Formally, we assume u = h(y), where u is the
utility level, y is income, and h' > 0^ The relationship between u and y
is not explained within the model; it depends on the general equilibrium
solution for the entire economy.
The condition u(x, q, z) = h(y) is equivalent to the condition
X = x(q, z, y) ; fixing y determines the indifference curve on which the
consumption bundle lies, and given values of q and z then determine x. It
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follows that 9x/3q = -u^/u^ < 0, 8x/9z = -u»/uj^ < , and 3x/8y = h'/u, > 0.
The budget constraint for an individual is R + x+t = y, where R is rent
and t is commuting cost. Combining the budget constraint with the fixed-
utility requirement yields R = y - t - x(q, z, y)
.
The owner of the rental dwelling providing the housing service level
q must pay property taxes on the value of the dwelling. The value v of
the unit will be the capitalized flow of returns per period to the owner, r.
Value will be proportional to r, and we assume to, the constant of propor-
tionality, is the same for all units, which implies that the discount rate
and the lifespan of units is the same throughout the econony. Thus, since
R equals r plus property taxes, we have R = r + wxr, where t is the effective
property tax rate. Consequently, r = (y - t - x(q, z, y))/(l + ojt) and
value is given by
, =
y - t - x(q,_z^l
_^ j^q^ ;^ ^^ y^ ^j ^ . ^^j
where 6 = l/u. Also, owner-occupiers must be indifferent between owning a
unit and renting an identical unit. That is, the capitalized value of rent
payments, uR, must equal the present value of the cost of owning a unit,
V + ojTv, again yielding (1) . We have
^1 = (9 ?T)u, ^° ^2)
h = (9 ?x)u^ >0 (3)
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1 - h' /u,
^
h'-rr-7 <o (6)
The sign of f, is positive because when the level of the housing services from
a unit increases, other things being equal, the amount of x the resident
consumes must decrease to keep him on the fixed indifference curve. The rent
(and the value) of the housing unit must increase to yield the required
reduction in x. The same argument explains the sign of f„. When the property
tax rate increajas, less of the fixed rent R of the unit is available as a
return to the owner, and value falls. When commuting cost rises, less income
is left for expenditure on x and q, and R (and v) must fall to keep the consumer
on the given indifference curve. The ambiguous sign of f , is due to two opposing
effects. Holding utility fixed, an increase in y must be accompanied by an
increase in R (and v) to keep the consumer's consumption of x constant. However,
utility increases with y, and this means that for fixed q and z, more x may be
consumed. Eence, R need not increase and may decrease with an increase in y.
The bid-rent model is different from standard consumer theory, where
consumers choose a consumption bundle to maximize utility subject to a budget
constraint. In standard theory, prices are exogenous and the utility level
endogenous, but in the bid-rent model, the utility level is exogenous and
prices (values) are endogenous. The nature of the housing stock is the reason
for this shift in emphasis. Housing is a durable commodity, and a spectrum
of different levels of housing services is available in the market, due to,
among other things, the different ages of units. If the price per unit of
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houslng services were the same for all housing units, those units which
did not provide some consumer's utility-maximizing level of services
would not be inhabited. All units in the housing stock must be inhabited
by someone, and this is assured by rents adjusting so that the utility
level of consumers is the same in all units
o
The bid-rent model leads to unconventional results on property
tax capitalization. Holding the unit size q fixed, an increase in the
tax rate t is fully capitalized in property value, a result which is
analogous to the conventional short-run capitalization effect. Since
we will be concerned with cross-section estimation, an alternative
1
statement of this result is that the difference in value of identical
units in communities with different property tax rates will reflect
full capitalization of the property tax -difference. Conventional long-run
analysis (see Mieszkowski (1972)) predicts above-average housing prices
in communities with above-average property tax rates, other things being
equal. This outcome is inconsistent with our model because it violates
the equal-utility requirement; consumers must pay the same rent for a
unit of a given size regardless of the amount of property taxes levied
on the unit. While conventional analysis assumes that capital is mobile
and that consiimers do not move to eliminate rent differentials, consumer
mobility is fundamental to our analysis.
The durability of the housing stock means that changes in the stock
in a community arise only through the decisions of producers supplying
new housing units (we implicitly ignore the effect of maintenance expendi-
tures in changing service levels from existing units) . In the long run.
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changes in fiscal variables will effect the supply decisions of producers;
the housing stocks in communities with different values for fiscal variables
may have different age distributions and average sizes of units. However,
even though the stocks may differ, the model says that values of identical
units in communities with different property tax rates will, ceteris paribus ,
reflect full capitalization of the tax rate differences.
This paper is not concerned with modeling the supply decisions of
producers of durable housing units; an attractive model of this complex
problem may be found in Muth(1973) » In equilibrium, however, the profits
of housing producers must be the same in all communities where new construction
occurs o Presumably, in a complete model, this condition would imply a
variation in land prices which would yield constant profits across cotumunities.
Equation (1) is not a complete model of property value determination
because it ignores the budget constraint of the local government. In our
sample, nearly all local revenue comes from the taxation of business and
residential propertyo Consider a community where the n residents all
have the same income y (an assumption which is relaxed later), wher-- aie
n housing units provide service levels q,, i=l, 2, o.., n, and have
associated commuting costs t. , i=l, 2 n, and where business and -
commercial property is valued at B. Let the cost of providing the public
good be C(z, n) . Then the budget constraint of the local government is
T E f(q^, z, T, y, t^) + tB = C(z, n)
,
(7)
where the presence of n in the cost function for the public good reflects
congestion effects. If
€2=0, z is a pure public good, while Cj >
implies the presence of congestion.
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The value of business property may be determined according to a
bid-rent model. Suppose ir . is the before-rent profit level of the j
business. Rent payments must reduce profits to zero: R, = tt.. Since the
value of business property is related to rent in the same way as is the value
of residential property, the value of the property housing the j business is
TT./Ce + t) . Aggregate business property value B equals Eir,/(0 + t) h 17/(6 + t)
,
where n is aggregate profit before rent. After substituting for B, (7) yields
an implicit relationship between the property tax rate and the other variables:
T = t(Q, z, y, T, n, tt) , (8)
where Q and T are the vectors of q. 's and t. 's respectively. Equation (8)
gives the tax rate required to support a public good level z for given values
of Q, y, T, n, and it. The derivative of the LHS of (7) with respect to t
is (B + Ev ) - t(B + Ev.)/(e + t) using (4) and noting the dependence of
B on T, Letting P = Ev., this reduces to e(P + B)/(e + t) . This expression
is positive, which means that property tax revenue is increasing in To
Totally differentiating (7) we have
-T(e + t) f (q , t )
3q, e(P + B)
" ^^^
The arguments of f which do not depend on i have been suppressed in (9).
Similarly
9t
-T(e + X) f3 (q^. t.)
__^
. 3t^ " e(p + b) " e(p + b) " • ^^^^
Also
.^ (6 + T)(C - T E f (q , t ))
°^
= ± 1 i ir < fll)
3z 6(P + B) "» ^^^^
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where the ambiguity is due to Cj^ > and £„ > 0, In addition
9t
-T(e + t) E f,(q., t )
^ ^ ~i^- < (12)
9y e(P + B)
3t -t
Sir e(P + B)
<
.
(13)
Changing n requires adding a unit to the housing stock. Suppose a unit
with value v is added. If n is large, we can approximate the change in x
resulting from a unit increase in n by
(e + t)(C, - tC)
which is ambiguous in sign when C2 > but is negative when C2 = Oo
The intuition behind these results is straightforward. An increase in
q, increases the value of the housing stock for fixed values of the values
of the other variables, raising revenue above expenditures. Since property
tax revenue is increasing in t, decreasing x reduces revenue and again
balances the budget. Similarly, increasing the commuting time from the j unit
(moving the unit farther away from the employment center) reduces aggregate
property value and requires an increase in x to offset the decline in revenue.
Since the effect of changes in y on property value is ambiguous, 8x/3y is
also ambiguous in sign. An increase in it increases revenue and requires a
decrease in x to maintain budget balance. An increase in z has two effects:
first, it Increases expenditures, and second, it increases property value.
After the change, it is unclear whether revenues are greater than or less than
expenditures, and hence the required direction of the property tax change that
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balances the budget is uncertain. Similarly, when n increases by one and
a unit is added to the housing stock, the increase in revenue may or may
not exceed the increase in cost when C. > 0, and the required change
in T is uncertain. When C- = 0, no increase in cost results from
increasing n, and since revenues rise, t must fall to maintain budget balance.
Substituting (8) in (7), we have
v^ = f(q^, z, t(Q, z, y, T, n, ir) , y, t^) (15)
Using (15), we can deduce how a change in any variable effects the value of
the i unit when the property tax rate adjusts to maintain budget balance
for the local government. Since f_ < 0, we have, using (9), (10), and (13),
3v. 8v. 9v
J 3
The change in v. from increasing n is, from (14), ambiguous when C- > and
positive when C- = 0. In addition
^^i . , . . , , . ^ 3t
-3- = f,(q^. t^) + f3(q,, tp
(TV. \
Similar calculations yield
9t ~ " e + T
(l + p^) <0 (18)
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8v TV
3v. V.
The intuition behind (16) is that any change v;hich effects the property tax
rate alone changes value in the opposite direction. From (17), increasing
q. has two effects: it directly increases v. and it indirectly increases v.
by allowing a reduction in the property tax rate. An equivalent argument
holds for (18) and increases in t,. Since the direct and indirect effects
of changes in y are ambiguous, the sign of (19) is ambiguous. Although
the direct effect on property value of an increase in z is positive, the tax
rate may either rise or fall with an increase in z, and hence the total effect
and the sign of (20) are uncertain.
Previous investigators have estimated an equation resembling (15) with
the property tax rate included among the explanatory variables. This renders
the estimated equation useless as a predictive tool because it does not
incorporate the government's budget constraint. For instance, it makes no
sense to vary t and z independently, as the estimated equation allows, and
deduce changes in property values, because the government budget constraint
may no longer be satisfied after such variation. However, if (15) is estimated
in cross-section, then the only fiscal variable included in the equation is
z, and variations in z holding the other variables fixed are implicitly
accompanied by variations in i which maintain budget balance for the government.
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In the next section we show that the coefficient on z has a special significance
because its magnitude provides information about the efficiency of public
good provision.
II.
We noted above that the q. may be effected in the long run by the fiscal
variables in the community. We could also argue that business profits before
rent might respond in the long-run to changes in the fiscal variables. Our
efficiency notion will ignore both these possible long-run effects: the
efficient values of the fiscal variables will be those which maximize aggregate
property value holding it and the q. fixed. Aggregate property value equals
T,\r
, + Tr/(e + t)
, and maximizing this expression subject to the government
budget constraint (7) requires
Z(f2(q^, t^) + f3(qj, tj) 8t/8z) - j^ 3T/az = 0, (21)
which reduces to
U3(q.)
I
t ^ = C^, (22)
tising (3), (4), and (11). Equation (22) is the well-known Samuelson condition
which states that the sian of the marginal rates of substitution between the
public good and the numeraire equals the marginal cost of the public good. This
condition also emerges if we require that the utility level u = h(y) be the
maximum level attainable for any values of the fiscal variables which satisfy
the government budget constraint, given suitable assumptions. Under these
assumptions, if (22) fails to hold, utility can be increased above h(y) by
changing the values of z and x.
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We now investigate the properties of 3v./8z from (20) when the public good
Is provided efficiently. First, we perform the analysis for the case 8=0,
which corresponds to a completely residential community, treating the B > case
later. Our first result is that if housing units are identical, or q.=q and
t
.
= t for all i, then 3v./8z = for all i when (22) holds. This follows because
when units are identical and B = 0, (20) becomes, using (3),
f2(q,t) -f f f2(q,t) - -^ = e^ <n ^ - C,} , (23)
which is zero when (22) holds with q. = q. Therefore, when units are identical
and the public good is provided efficiently, 9v. /9z = for all i; an increase
in z accompanied by a change in t which maintains budget balance has no effect
on property values. This follows intuitively from the efficiency condition;
if aggregate property value (and hence individual unit values in the identical
dwelling case) have been maximized by choice of z and x, a change in z and a
corresponding change in t will have no effect on unit values since they are
already stationary.
When housing units are different, (20) can be written
Uo(q^)
6 + T Uj^(q^)
which equals
V. u_(q,)
4 ^ Tire I -^ - S> ' (24)
1 "S^^i^ ^i ^3^'^i^
6 + T ^ Uj^(q^) P ^ U3^(q^) ^ ^^^^
when (22) holds. If v. is close to P/n we might expect u^(q.)/u^ (q.) to be
approximately (E u,/u.)/n, making (25) equal to zero. To make this notion
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more precise, suppose the utility function is Cobb-Douglas: u = x q z o
Then u-/u^ = yx./az and (25) can be written
1 ^"^^
y " h '""i J^ _ tYy(Xj^ - x) + Y(t^x - te^)3 ^ (26)
e + ^ «2 n(y - I - X) "^ az(0 + t) (y - t - x)
where T and x are mean values. Suppose all the units in a community are
roughly equidistant from the emplojrment center, as would be the case in a
suburban residential community. Then we may set t^ = t for all i, which gives
(26) the same sign as
Y(y - t)(x^ - x) . (27)
For the unit whose associated x level equals x, (27) is zero and hence 3v/3z = 0;
the unit's value is unchanged when z increases. Those units with high associated
X levels have low q levels from the uniform utility requirement and therefore
have low values, because value is increasing in q from (2), Similarly, units
with low associated x levels have high values. Therefore, (27) says that
3v/3z is positive for low-valued units and negative for high-valued units.
The median-valued unit will be associated with the median x level, x . The
relationship of x to x depends both on the distribution of the q^ and on the
shape of the indifference curve, and nothing can be said in general about it.
However, x will be close to x, and from (27), the change in the value of the
median-valued unit when z increases and the public good is efficiently provided
will be approximately zero. A similar argument can be made for a general
2
utility function .
Results similar to some of our conclusions were noted by Hamilton (1976),
whose model is much less general than the one analyzed in this paper. The
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intultion behind our results is that while efficiency leads to the maximization
of aggregate property value, it does not maximize the value of each unit.
Those units which contribute relatively small amounts of property taxes to
government revenue enjoy a positive fiscal surplus and their values increase
when z increases. Those units with a negative fiscal surplus, large units,
suffer a decline in value when z expands.
What does inefficient provision of the public good imply for the variation
of property values as z changes? An assimiption that appears to be empirically
supported is that the public good is characterized by constant returns to
3
scale: C^^ =0. In the Cobb-Douglas example, when u and q. are fixed,
fX-./az is decreasing in z. Together, these properties imply that if z is
above the efficient level, lyx./az - C^ < 0, and if z is below the efficient
level, EyXj/az - C^ > 0. It is easily seen that this implies that (24) Is
greater than (less than) (26) when z is less than (greater than) the efficient
level. When t. = t, this means that
^^i >
-r-i < a(x. - x) as z > z*
,
(28)
oz 1
where z* is the efficient level of z and a = Y(y - t)/az(e + t) (y - t - x)
.
For the housing unit whose associated x value equals x, the RHS of (28) is
zero, and 3v/3z < as z > z*. Since x is close to x, we can make the
following claim: approximately, the value of the median-valued unit is
increasing (decreasing) in z when z is less than (greater than) z*. A similar
4
result holds for a general utility function.
When B > 0, the results are slightly different. When the efficiency
condition (22) holds, 8v /3z becomes
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"3^^!^
__Ii_ r "3^qj^I
, \ } . (29)
e + T
"iCq^) P + B uj^Cq.)
In the Cobb-Douglas case when t. = t for all i, this reduces to
Y(y - t)(x.- x) + YX. (e + t) B/n
(e + t) az (y - t - X + (e + t) B/n)
= fi^, (30)
which says that 9v/9z > for the unit whose associated x value is x. As
in (28), we have 9v./9z < n. as z > z*. Since fi. > when x. = x, this says
that 9v/9z > for the unit with x, = x when z < z*, but that 9v/9z may be
either positive or negative for this unit when z > z*. These statements hold
approximately for the median-valued unit: when B > 0, the value of the
median-valued unit is increasing in z when (22) holds; when z < z*, the value
of the median-valued unit is increasing in z, but its value may either increase
or decrease with z when z > z*.
When more than two public goods are provided, analysis similar to that
presented above may be performed. With efficiency, 9v/9z. is approximately
zero for the median-valued unit for all public goods z. when B = 0, and is positive
for that unit for all z. when B > 0. To characterize 9v/9z. when the public
goods are not provided efficiently, we require separable utility and cost
functions so that marginal rate of substitution between each public good and
the numeraire does not depend on the levels of other public goods and so that
the marginal cost of each public good is independent of the levels of the other
public goods. The Cobb-Douglas utility function satisfies the separability
requirement. With separability, the following statements are approximately
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true for all public goods z.: 3v/3z. < for the median-valued unit as z. > z.*
when B = 0; if B > 0, 3v/9z. is positive for the median-valued unit when z. < z.*
but may be of either sign when z. > z.*.
In reality, income is not uniform in communities, and our model must
be modified to take account of this fact. If y. is the income of the occupant
of the i unit, then v. = f(q., z, x, y , t . ) , The equation corresponding
to (8) derived from the government budget constraint is x = x(Q, z, Y, T,
n, tt) , where Y is the vector of the y.'s. As before, the signs of 3v^/9y^
and 3v./9y., j # i, are ambiguous. Also, the partial derivatives of v. with
respect q,, t. , q., t., j i^i, n, and ir all have the same signs as in the
uniform-income case.
Efficiency still requires that equation (22) be satisfied, and 8v^/3z
still is given by (29) when B > 0. Using the Cobb-Douglas example, we can see
how the above analysis changes when income is not uniform. Assuming that the
public good is efficiently provided and that t. = t for all i, 3v./9z becomes
Y[(x.y - y.x) - t(x. - x) + x.(e + t) B/n]
i i _ ?-___ 1 (31)
az(e + x)(y - t - x + (0 + x) B/n)
We are interested in the sign of (31) for the median-valued unit, but when
incomes vary, the median-valued unit and the unit which provides the median
level of housing services are no longer identical because unit value depends
both on housing services provided and on the income of the occupant. However,
given two reasonable assumptions which seem to reflect reality, the sign of
(31) will be close to zero when B = and positive when B > for the
median-valued unit. The assumptions are that as a consumer's income rises.
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hls X consumption Increases and the value of the dwelling he chooses increases
as well. The latter requirement is not the same as assuming f , > in (5);
that derivative requires a fixed dwelling size when income increases, while
our assumption permits changes in q when income rises. These assumptions are
quite innocuous and seem to be borne out in the real world. Since unit value
increases with the income of the occupant, the median-valued unit is occupied
by the individual with the median income, and this individual also consumes
the median amount of x in the community. Thus for the i corresponding to the
median-valued dwelling, the numerator of (31) is Y[(xy - yx) - t(x - x)
+ x(e + t) B/n], where the tildes refer to median values. The first part of
this expression will be near zero since the means will be close to the medians,
Hence, given our assumptions, 9v/8z will be approximately zero for the
median-valued dwelling when the public good is provided efficiently and B = 0.
As before, when B = 0, 9v/8z for the median-valued dwelling will be (approxi-
mately) greater than (less than) zero when z is less than (greater than) the
efficient level. The results for the B > case are also the same as before.
We have shown that under our assumptions, the modified model has the same
qualitative properties as the constant-income model.
One further assumption, however, is required to make the modified model
operational empirically. The difficulty is that the analysis yields no predic-
tion about the q level of the median-valued unit. The assumption we require
is that as income increases, people live in units with higher q levels. Then
the median-valued unit will be the unit providing the median level of services.
This last assumption, like the others, appears to hold in reality.
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III.
In this section we present linear cross-section regression equations for
the year 1960 based on the relation v = f(q., z, t(Q, z, Y, T, n, it), y., t,),
which can be written
"^i " ^^'^i' ^i* ^' ^* " ""' ^^'
^^^' ^^^^
assuming t. = t for all i and defining Q and Y to be the vectors of the q.'s
and y . ' s with q . and y_, deleted
.
2 1 •'i
We are principally interested in the sign of the coefficient on z when
i corresponds to the median-valued unit. It should be noted that the linear
fonn of the regression equation implies that the coefficient on z is the same
in all communities, which means that the public good is overprovided,
imderprovided , or efficiently provided in all communities. This implicit
assumption is restrictive, but it simplifies the estimation problem and may
be justified by the notion that a bias for over- or underprovision of public
goods may be present in all communities.
The theory allows us to interpret the sign of the coefficient on z
in (32) when q, = q, y. = y, and v. = v, the median property value. However,
the only available value data give the median value of owner-occupied units
for the communities in the sample. The median-valued oxmer-occupied unit \irLll
not be the same as the median-valued unit among all units in the community
because owner-occupied units tend to be larger than renter-occupied units.
Thus, no unit value data is available which corresponds exactly to the require-
ments of the theory. This problem was circumvented in the following way.
>^Ui::i.^
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First, we estimated (32) with the available data on the median value of
owner-occupied units, using the median number of rooms of owner-occupied
units as a measure of the q value of the median-valued owner-occupied unit.
Then, using data on the median number of rooms in all units, both renter-and
owner-occupied, we computed the median value for all units using the expression
V = V + b(q - q ), where v and v are the median values for all units and
owner-occupied units respectively, q and q are the median number of rooms
in all units and owner-occupied units respectively, and b is the estimated
coefficient relating v to q o Since the estimated coefficient b is positive
and q < q , v < v . With v as the dependent variable, we then estimated
(32) with q. = q and y. = yo It is the estimated coefficients from this
equation that bear on the efficiency question. It should be noted that in
the regression relating v to q , y was also used as the measure of the income
of the occupant of the median-valued owner-occupied unit, a procedure which
is not strictly correct given the discussion at the end of section II.
In the regressions, the percent of structures in the community built
before 1950 was used as a proxy for Q , and the percent of families with incomes
below $3000 was used as a proxy for Y . These variables were labeled OLD and
POOR, while median income was denoted YM. Population was 1960 census population,
N. As a measure of t, we followed Gates and used linear distance in miles to
downtown Manhattan, MI. The median number of rooms in all units and
owner-occupied units were denoted RNSA and FMSO respectively. As a proxy
for i:, business profits before rent, we used total 1963 sales of retail,
wholesale, and service establishments, denoted SLS.
The level of expenditures on public goods was employed as a proxy for
public good output. Letting C denote expenditures, the expression C = C(z, n)
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may be inverted to yield z = z(C, n) , with 9z/3C = l/C, and 8z/9n = - Cj/C,.
Substituting z(C, n) in (32), we have 9v./3C = (3h/9z)/C-. Since C, > 0,
the sign of the coefficient relating value to C has exactly the same efficiency
interpretation as the sign of the coefficient relating value to z. Since n
appears twice in (32) when z(C, n) is substituted for z, v. /9n = - ^hl'bziCJC^)
+ 9h/9n. When C- = 0, 9v./9n = 9h/9n, which is positive from above when
C^ = 0. When C™ > 0, the sign of 9h/9n is ambiguous, and since 9h/9z may
have either sign, 9v,/9n is of indeterminate signo It should be noted that
a zero regression coefficient on n need not imply C„ = 0. When two public
1 2
goods have the separable cost function C (z^, n) + C (z^, n) , we can replace
1 2
z^ by C and z_ by C in an equation such as (32), and the coefficients on
1 2
C and C will have the same efficiency interpretations as those on z, and z„.
We computed two sets of regressions reflecting different assumptions
about the number of public goods provided in the communities. In the first
set, the communities were viewed as producing a composite public good, and
total community expenditures, TEXP, was the expenditure variable. In the
second set of regressions, we assumed communities produce two public goods,
education and other municipal services, and the expenditure variables were
EEXP, educational expenditure, and MEXP, other municipal expenditure.
The estimating equations using the owner-occupied value data were
Vq = a^ + a^^ RMSO + 32 YM + a^ TEXP + a^ MI +
a^ N + a, SLS + a, OLD + ag POOR, (33)
and another linear equation with EEXP and MEXP in place of TEXP. Results
from log-linear equations were inferior to the linear results, and are not
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reported. The discussion in sections I and II suggested that the housing
stock and business profits may be endogenous variables which are effected by
the fiscal variables as well as by other variables. In addition, public
good expenditures are themselves endogenous, representing the outcome of a
political process. Although it could argued that the income distribution
and the population of the community are also endogenous variables, we have
decided to treat them as exogenous. Given these considerations, we computed
two-stage least squares regressions treating RMSO, SLS, OLD, and the expenditure
variables as endogenous, and also computed ordinary least squares estimates.
In addition to YM, MI, N, and POOR, other exogenous variables were EDUC,
median number of years of school completed by males over twenty-five years of
age, a dummy variable which assumed the value of unity for communities in
Hudson County and zero otherwise, PRPUB, the percent of the population enrolled
in public schools, DEN, population density, WC, percent of employed persons
in VThite collar professions, PROWN, percent of housing units owner-occupied,
DELTN, percent change in population between 1950 and 1960, and MIGR, the
percentage of residents over five years of age who were living in a different
community in 1955.
The OLS and TSLS estimates with v^, as the dependent variable are presented
in Table I. Recall that the theory is ambiguous about the signs of the
coefficients of YM, POOR, N, and the expenditure variables. It predicts positive
coefficients for RMSO and SLS and negative coefficients for MI and OLD. The
model is not contradicted by the OLS results; RMSO, SLS, MI, and OLD have
significant coefficients with the correct signs, while the coefficient of N
is insignificant and YM and POOR have significantly positive coefficients.
poor's positive coefficient is somewhat mystifying; it says that holding YM
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and the other variables fixed, a community with a large poor population has
a higher median value for owner-occupied units than one with a small poor
population. The estimated coefficients for the expenditure variables are not
significantly different from zero. Inspection of (30), however, shows that
when X, < x, an inequality which is probably satisfied for the median-valued
owner-occupied unit (which has q > q and x < x) , the sign of 9v/Sz. may be
either positive or negative when public goods are provided efficiently. Thus,
the signs of the estimated coefficients have no implications for efficiency.
The TSLS estimates are similar to the OLS estimates, the principal dif-
ferences being the insignificance of the POOR coefficient in the EEXP-MEXP
equation and the significant negativity of the TEXP and EEXP coefficients in
their respective equations. As before, no efficiency statement can be made
on the basis of these results
o
Table II presents TSLS estimates based on the computed v variable,
which permit us to discuss efficiency. The estimated coefficients of RMSO
"vO
from the two TSLS equations with v as the dependent variable were used as
'vA
described above to derive two vectors of v values, one corresponding to each
equation. Then the TSLS equations were reestimated using the appropriate
•\>A 'X'OV vector and FMSA in place of RMSO, The mean of the v variable in the sample
is $19,154 while the means of the computed v variables from the TEXP and
EEXP-MEXP equations are $17,028 and $16,845 respectively.
Aside from the expenditure variables, the principal changes in the
estimates are the insignificance of the SLS coefficients and the insignificance
of the POOR coefficient in the TEXP equationo The former is somewhat worrying,
although comfort may be taken from the fact that the t-ratios for the (positive)
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SLS estimates are relatively large. All the expenditure coefficient estimates
in the equations are significantly negative, and efficiency requires that they
be positive. Recall from section II that where B > 0, 8v/3z > when z < z*
and that 9v/3z may be either positive or negative when z > z*. Since our
estimated coefficients are significantly negative, the theory implies that
public goods are overprovided in our sample, regardless of whether we view
the public good output as one or two goods,
IV,
Our efficiency result is somewhat surprising; economists have long been
concerned with possible underprovision of public goods as a result of free-rider
behavior. The result may, of course, be peculiar to our sample, which contains
relatively affluent bedroom communities with high percentages of white-collar
workers. Perhaps the altruism of well-educated people such as those in our
sample imparts an over-production bias to the public sector in the communities
where they reside. This conjecture could be tested by repeating the empirical
work using a sample of less affluent communities
o
It is important to know how much credence may be placed in our conclusion
that public goods are overprovided. Recall that the analysis relied heavily
on approximate statements which arose because of uncertainty about the relative
magnitudes of x and x and y and yo Non-zero coefficients on the expenditure
variables might not be inconsistent with efficiency if there is a great difference
between x and x or between y and y. It seems unlikely, however, that statis-
tically significant negative coefficients could be generated by the divergence
between medians and means when the public goods are provided efficiently. Another
difficulty with the argument is the rough fashion in which the v variable
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was constructed. If we have badly misestimated the median value, then our
interpretation of the results will not be correct. However, improving on our
technique for estimating v does not seem possible. Another problem is the
lack of data on house quality, a determinant of q. Almost all units in the
sample qualify as sound housing, so data on percent of units dilapidated or
with substandard plumbing are not useful for measuring quality, as they might
be in poorer communities. It is possible that the strong positive significance
of median income in the regressions captures the effect of income on variables
such as the size of yards and the quality of construction which are not
represented by the median number of rooms variable. It is uncertain, however,
whether the mis-specification introduced by the omission of quality variables
seriously biases the results.
In conclusion, it must be stressed that the importance of the empirical
results in this paper is due more to their very existence than to the particular
Implication that public goods are overprovided in northeastern New Jersey.
We have constructed a model which permits evaluation of the efficiency of the
provision of public goods using readily available data. While refinement of
empirical technique and better data from other samples might lead eventually
to more reliable verdicts on efficiency, this paper has provided the first
complete framework for investigating this important issue.
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Data Sources
The sources for the variables v , RMSO, YM, MI, N, OLD, POOR, EDUC, PRPUB,
DEN, PROWN, and DELTN are listed in Gates (1969). RMSA was taken from the
1960 Census of Housing ; SLS was taken from the 1963 Census of Business ;
WC and MIGR were taken from the Municipal Yearbook, 1963 (see Oates) ; and
TEXP, EEXP, and MEXP were taken from the Twenty-Third Annual Report of the
Division of Local Government, State of New Jersey, 1960(see Oates).
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Foo tno tes
So far we have Ignored the possibility that rental income may be a component
of income for some consiomerSo The model becomes intractable when this feature
is added; it turns out that the values of units must be simultaneously
determined when rental income is included o Since only a small fraction of the
population receives rental income, its omission from the model is defensibleo
However, we will demonstrate that (22) holds at a utility maximum when rental
income is added to the model in a certain way, but we must first introduce
some convenient simplifications to avoid dealing with issues related to the
production of structures. In particular, imagine that "housing" and business
"property" are non-produced goods similar to free land, being owned by
individuals with no initial outlay required for acquisition. Suppose that
the community has decided to divide total rental income equally among the
residents. Net rental income from the i "housing" unit is ©v. since there
are no costs of ownership. Each consumer's share of total rental income is
thus (Eev. + e7r/(9 + T))/n= Letting w be wage income, the value of the i
unit is V
w + (Eev. + e-rr/Ce + T))/n - t. - X..
V, = i-
-g^^ i-^ (!')
Consider the problem of maximizing u(x,
, q, , z) for an arbitrary index k
subject to the n constraints corresponding to (l"*) , to the n - 1 constraints
u(x,
, q, , z) = u(x. , q., z) i ?^ k, and to the government budget constraint
tEv. + TiT/(e + t) = C(z,n). The choice variables are z, t, x., v.,
i = 1, 2, .0., n. The solution to this problem yields the maximum uniform
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utility level consistent with the consumer and government budget constraints,
and it is characterized in part by (22). If (22) does not hold utility may
be Increased by changing z and t.
A rigorous characterization of efficiency requires a complete general
equilibrium model. The model sketched above is incomplete because the
determination of w and tt is not specified and the industries producing x and
residential and business structures are not described. Construction of a
true general equilibrium model is beyond the scope of this paper; our
Incomplete model is designed to show how (22) emerges when rental income is
taken into account. Condition (22) would undoubtedly emerge in a complete
general equilibrium model as well.
2
For the Cobb-Douglas utility function, u-j/u, increases when u and z are
fixed and x increases, a property which is shared by the CES utility function.
For any utility function which has this property, an argument qualitatively
similar to the one presented for the Cobb-Douglas function holds. In particular,
suppose (25) equals zero for q, = q*. A unit with q. > q* has v. > v* and
X. < X*, which means (25) for that unit is negative. Similarly (25) is
positive when q, < q*. Hence 8v./8z - as q, - q* when the public good is
provided efficiently. The relationship of q* to q, the median q level is
a.
uncertain in general, but q* will probably be close to q.
3
Hirsch (1968) cites evidence which shows constant average costs for pri-
mary and secondary education, police services, and refuse collection, with
scale economies present only for five services. It appears reasonable to
assume C^- = in light of the evidence.
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4 When q and u are fixed, u-/u^ is decreasing in z when the utility function
is quasi-concave, and it follows that for the housing unit with q = q* (see
footnote (2)), 9v/3z will be positive (negative) when z is less than
(greater than) the efficient level as long as C, ^= 0»
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